Titan submersible didn’t get ‘any oversight’ in Canada, TSB report says

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) said the Titan submersible implosion in June 2023 was caused by a combination of engineering faults as well as risk management that was “hindered by the structure and composition of the company,” OceanGate.

Officials are also urging more regulatory oversight to help prevent a similar disaster.

“The Titan did not receive any oversight from TC. This situation is not unique; in fact, in Canada, it is relatively common for vessels to receive no oversight from the TC.”

The TSB on Wednesday released the details of its analysis of the incident, which claimed the lives of five people who were diving to visit the wreck of the Titanic. The report is based on its own engineering analysis of the materials and components that were recovered from the wreck, combined with other data from the investigation.

“I think OceanGate really wanted to move ahead with their design and get it under water to get this operation going and sell expeditions to the Titanic. This led them to design a sub that did not really meet recognized engineering criteria,” said TSB chair Yoan Marier speaking to Global News.

“Not only that, but it was not registered in any country, was not certified, it was not classed. So there was no real way for anybody besides OceanGate, essentially, to assess the risk of this operation.”

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The TSB report says OceanGate’s construction and testing of the Titan “did not follow standard engineering practices.”

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On June 18, 2023, the submersible went missing in the northern Atlantic Ocean during an underwater expedition to view the site of the Titanic shipwreck. It was then recovered several days later from the ocean floor, where it was found near the Titanic wreck.

2:12 Deadly Oceangate Titan submersible implosion was ‘preventable,’ U.S. report reveals

The report determined that the design and structural composition of the submersible was one of the main reasons it ultimately imploded.

“Analysis by the TSB Laboratory determined that the reduced compressive strength of the Titan’s carbon fibre cylinder, as well as defects that were potentially introduced during manufacturing, operations, storage, and transport of the Titan, likely led the cylinder to fail progressively, due to damage accumulating during each dive cycle, until it imploded.”

The report also says the use of carbon fibre for the hull in a human-occupied submersible intended for deep-ocean exploration is “novel,” and that these applications typically mean the submersibles should be in the shape of a sphere, rather than a cylinder, because they can withstand the tremendous water pressure better.

Although the Titan submersible completed dozens of previous dives, including to the Titanic wreck, the TSB says OceanGate could not adequately determine how long the carbon fibre hull would remain structurally intact after repeated dives.

The TSB said in the report it determined that a “lack of regulatory oversight to identify safety deficiencies resulted in increased risk to those involved in the Titan’s operations.”

Marier says there are about 28,000 vessels in Canada which are not required to be certified, including because they may fall below a certain size threshold. In the case of the Titan, even if it was registered with Canada or another country, it still would not have been required to be certified because of it’s smaller size.

“These small vessels, essentially, the system relies on the operators of these vessels, the owners, the authorized representatives, to voluntarily comply with the regulations.”

He adds: “Essentially, from a regulatory standpoint, it flew under the radar.”

5:36 Remembering Titanic on anniversary of its tragic sinking

The report includes a list of six recommendations to “eliminate or reduce safety deficiencies that pose significant risks to the transportation system and require action by regulators and the industry”:

• First, the TSB says the Department of Transport should develop risk-based oversight criteria and priorities that are specific to Canadian uncertified commercial vessels. The TSB says its investigation found that there was a lack of regulatory oversight in the case of the Titan’s operations, which means increased risk to those involved.
• Second, the TSB says the Department of Transport should develop similar risk-based oversight criteria and priorities for commercial vessels that are registered outside of port state control oversight.
• Third, the Department of Transport should establish a series of processes to obtain information from other government departments about commercial vessel operations. This, the report says, is to help better evaluate any risks and act accordingly.
• Fourth, the TSB recommends that the Department of Transport advocate to the International Maritime Organization to incorporate specific guidelines into international conventions or codes. The TSB makes reference here to the Maritime Safety Committee Circular 981 (MSC 981), which includes guidelines for the design, construction and operation of submersibles that carry passengers.
• Fifth, once the International Maritime Organization adopts the MSC 981 guidelines, the TSB says the Department of Transport should require that all human-occupied submersibles registered in Canada operate with a Canadian support ship (like the Titan was along with Canada’s Polar Prince support ship), or operating in Canadian waters or Canada’s exclusive economic zone comply with the requirements of the MSC 981 guidelines via the International Maritime Organization.
• Finally, the TSB recommends that the Department of Transport ensure that when one or more groups work on a Canadian vessel, or one that otherwise operates under the Coasting Trade Act, those groups co-ordinate their operations and safety management through bridging documents and other processes. This, the report says, would help prevent safety gaps that could arise if operations are not clearly co-ordinated.

Marier says these recommendations are intended to ensure a disaster like the Titan submersible implosion doesn’t happen again, and increasing regulatory oversight to include these small vessels is key.

“We’re not asking for Transport Canada to prohibit submersible operations in Canada, but we’re asking for a level of oversight that is proportional with the amount of risk,” says Marier,

“So of course a vessel like the Titan submersible that goes down to 4,000 meters, it’s a risky operation — in the best of scenarios it’s a risky operation … and for small vessels right now, the level of oversight is sometimes completely absent.”