A former Canadian politician is suspected of trying to influence Parliament’s work on behalf of a foreign government, according to documents released by the foreign interference commission Friday.
No identifying information about the parliamentarian — whether they were a senator or MP, or what party they belonged to — was included in the documents, nor was the country they were allegedly working for named.
But it’s a previously unknown instance of direct foreign interference in Canada’s democracy.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), working with other security and intelligence agencies, produced a list of six significant instances of suspected foreign interference in recent years.
Four were previously detailed by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue’s inquiry into foreign influence operations in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. The remaining two had not been previously disclosed to the public.
In addition to the parliamentarian suspected to have clandestinely worked for a foreign government, the list also included an instance of another state working to block the election of a Liberal MP.
“Reporting indicates a foreign government undertook several actions, including interference, to reduce the likelihood of a specific Liberal candidate from being elected federally,” the document read.
“It is suspected that the foreign government sought to thwart the candidate’s bid given their support for issues perceived to be contrary to the foreign government’s interests.”
The remaining four instances of foreign interference listed by the intelligence agency were detailed in the first phase of Hogue’s inquiry:
-The Government of Pakistan “attempted to clandestinely influence Canadian federal politics with the aim of furthering (their) interests in Canada.”
-An instance of a foreign government official suspected of interference activities, which resulted in classified briefings to both Liberal Party representatives and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau around the 2021 election.
-The Government of India allegedly used proxy agents to “clandestinely provide financial support to specific candidates from three political parties in a federal election.” Intelligence could not confirm the candidates received the funds, or if the candidates were aware of the source of the money.
-Reporting indicating a foreign government “actively supported” a candidate in a 2019 nomination contest in Don Valley North, including “through the use of a proxy agent.”
That last instance refers to “irregularities” in the Liberal’s 2019 nomination contest in Don Valley North, first reported by Global News, which was won by Han Dong. After Global’s reporting was published, Dong stepped away from the Liberal caucus and remains an independent MP today.
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Dong has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing, and is suing Global’s parent company, Corus Entertainment.
The revelations that a former parliamentarian was allegedly working on another government’s behalf comes on the heels of months of significant developments on the foreign interference file.
In June, a bombshell report from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) – a cross-partisan committee that includes top-secret cleared MPs and senators – revealed that multiple federal politicians knowingly worked with hostile countries to interfere in Canadian democracy.
In one instance, a politician allegedly provided confidential government information to “a known intelligence officer of a foreign state.”
It also found that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) “successfully” interfered in the Don Valley North nomination, and had a “significant impact” on Dong’s victory in that contest.
The NSICOP report followed Hogue’s preliminary report, released in May, which found that multiple federal candidates in the 2019 election “appeared willing” to go along with foreign interference schemes.
Hogue concluded that while foreign powers attempted to influence both the 2019 and 2021 elections, the efforts did not determine the overall results of those contests. Canadian voters, not foreign actors, chose their governments.
The Québec appeals court judge nevertheless concluded the foreign interference operations constituted a “stain on Canada’s electoral process.”
Other documents released by the commission Friday raised questions about how swiftly the government responds to concerns about foreign interference.
Testimony suggested that in March 2021, with a general election on the horizon, CSIS delivered a warrant to then-public safety minister Bill Blair that targeted a politician suspected of engaging in foreign interference. Michelle Tessier, the former deputy director of operations at CSIS, testified that she briefed Blair’s then-chief of staff, Zita Astravas, on the warrant before it was delivered.
CSIS typically anticipates a 10-day window between when a warrant is given to the public safety minister and when that minister makes a decision on it. But the testimony indicated it sat in Blair’s office for more than 50 days before being put in front of Blair for a decision.
News reports from May 2023 suggest that the target of the warrant was Michael Chan, a former Ontario Liberal cabinet minister, longtime Liberal Party GTA powerbroker and now the deputy mayor of Markham, Ont.
Tessier told the commission that the agency’s headquarters, regional office and agents “were very frustrated with what they perceived as a delay in obtaining the minister’s approval for this warrant.”
But David Vigneault, who recently resigned as CSIS director, testified that he was “comfortable letting things play out.”
Blair’s office issued a statement after the 2023 news reports that “it is a standard practice to review the information available and clarify any outstanding questions or concerns prior to the authorization of such an application.”
Asked Friday if he had any reason to believe that Astravas kept the warrant from Blair, Vigneault said he was “aware of the timeline” and “when we engaged the minister directly, he signed the warrant.”
“I can only speak to what I know, which is those facts, and I could not speculate any other way,” Vigneault responded.
Chan is suing CSIS and unidentified employees who he alleges leaked classified information with the intent of harming his reputation. He is also suing the Crown, the attorney-general of Canada, the CSIS director, and two journalists who have written stories on Chan based on leaked classified information, including a former Global News journalist.
The stories inaccurately implicated him in allegations of election interference, he said, and he is seeking a total of $10 million in damages.
The stream of details about parliamentarians and candidates apparently willingly cooperated with foreign powers has led to calls for the government to “name names” – to identify those politicians suspected to be under the sway of another government.
But intelligence isn’t always evidence. There is a gap between what intelligence agencies may suspect – even with a high degree of confidence – and what can be proven in a court of law. And releasing the names without evidence means those suspected of engaging with foreign governments have little ability to defend themselves.
In a press release before the most recent round of testimony, Hogue addressed the desire to name the politicians directly.
“Because the allegations contained in the NSICOP report are based on classified information that cannot be disclosed to the individuals in question, those individuals would not be in a position to be heard in respect of any potential findings that the commission might consider making against them,” Hogue wrote in a public statement earlier this month.
“Indeed, the commission would not even be in a position to advise the individauls that their activities may have formed part of the NSICOP’s review. Thus, as a result of its dual obligations to respect national security confidentiality and the rules of procedural fairness, the commission cannot make any findings that might identify the individuals involved in the allegations.”
Hogue’s inquiry is scheduled to continue hearing testimony until Oct. 16. Witnesses include senior bureaucrats and intelligence officials, political staff and politicians, including Trudeau. Hogue’s final report is due by the end of the year.
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