

Joint Task Force (Pacific)
PO Box 17000 Stn Forces
Victoria BC V9A 7N2

6435-3350-1 (JTFP LLSO/RDIMS 745226)

18 December 2017

Distribution List

**POST OPERATION REPORT
JOINT TASK FORCE PACIFIC
OPERATION LENTUS 17-04**

References: see Annex A

BACKGROUND

1. Disaster response activities are common throughout the province of British Columbia (BC) which is a consequence of the vast geographic diversity. While the province maintains robust emergency response capabilities capable of surging in such events, the size, scope, and duration of the 2017 fire season was such that it warranted requests for federal assistance.
2. Due to well-below average spring precipitation, an unprecedented fire situation rapidly manifested itself in many regions of the province; BC declared a state of emergency on the evening of 7 July 2017. On 8 July 2017, Joint Task Force Pacific (JTFP) received a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) initiating directive for Operation (Op) LENTUS 17-04, directing that Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) elements push resources into BC in anticipation of a provincial submission of a Request For Assistance (RFA) to the Government of Canada. The provincial government quickly assessed the need for additional resources in support of the fire relief effort and submitted the first RFA on 9 July 2017.
3. In accordance with the CDS order, the CAF response focused on the rapid deployment of forces to support the provincial authorities in their fire relief efforts. Throughout the period of this Domestic Operation (DOMOP), the CAF received a total of three RFAs:
 - a. RFA #1 - 9 Jul 2017:
 - (1) provision of air assets, to support emergency evacuation of threatened communities;
 - (2) provision of air support to move first responders and equipment; and
 - (3) Air Movement Teams to support the processing of personnel during air evacuation;

- b. RFA #2 - 17 July 2017:
 - (1) Provision of Observation and Reporting Points to assist / enable evacuations;
 - (2) assist with ground evacuation and movement of equipment; and
 - (3) provision of air assets, to assist with transport of first responders and related equipment to, from and within the affected areas; and
- c. RFA #3 - 3 August 2017:
 - (1) provision of self-sustained firefighting (Tier 3) personnel; and
 - (2) provision of CAF facilities for use as British Columbia Wildfire Service (BCWS) staging areas for personnel entering and departing the fire areas.

AIM

4. The aim of the report is to identify significant operational-level lessons, as observed during all phases of Op LENTUS 17-04, in order to better prepare for future DOMOPs.

KEY FINDINGS

5. JTFP was tasked to lead the CAF support to the province with the forces generated from other commands. Overall, the response from these disparate elements was outstanding, as seen by the effective deployment and employment phases. At the operation's peak, there were 800 personnel operating in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) fulfilling three unique lines of operation in support of the province. Below are the key observations from the operation, divided by those lessons to sustain and those that could be improved upon.

6. Sustain. The following key findings should be sustained in future operations.

- a. JTFP. Op LENTUS 17-04 was conducted over a 10 week period from the initial deployment through until all assets had been returned to their home units. Due to this duration JTFP maintained a flexible approach with the Force Generators (FGs) allowing for multiple Reliefs in Place (RIPs). This flexibility allowed for the FGs to meet other operational and training commitments while ensuring that the level of support to JTFP was maintained. Future DOMOPs of this duration must include policies and procedures to accommodate this high flow of personnel in and out of the JOA;

b. JTFP Headquarters (HQ).

- (1) JTFP HQ's force structure achieved the desired strategic effect while minimizing the deployment of larger Command and Control (C2) elements. Though there were capability gaps in JTFP headquarters (which will be discussed further in the document), the Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) structure provided effective C2 given the size of the air and land task forces. The continued command liaison with regional partners (i.e. the Federal Coordination Group and Central Coordination Group teleconferences) and coordination with FGs led to the success of the operation. Should larger-scale land effects be required, the deployment of a Land Component Command (LCC) should be considered; and
- (2) the Other Government Department (OGD) and Regional Liaison Officer (RLO) program deployment and engagement strategy was essential in maintaining situational awareness and provided significant insight for the JTFP command team. The value of skilled liaison and planning officers cannot be overstated. These skills, but more importantly relationships, must be cultivated and refined in the years ahead to ensure the formation has the right personnel with the appropriate skill sets;

c. Air Task Force (ATF).

- (1) Op LENTUS 17-04 confirmed the 2 Wing Air Expeditionary concept is also valid for domestic ops. Specifically, it was able to rapidly deploy and provide the requested effects, acting as a force multiplier amongst a host of other provincial air assets. 2 Wing's contribution increased overall ATF efficiency, facilitating the rapid employment and coordination of air power. This capability should be replicated in similar situations and reflected in 2 Wing staffing levels;
- (2) the use of a customized Sharepoint site should be maintained for future operations. Op LENTUS 17-04 took advantage of a tool developed by ACCE(E) (a lesson to sustain from Op LENTUS 17-03) to provide all users with access to such documentation as the daily Fying Program (Flypro), aircraft status and serviceability, and a Request for Effect (RFE) tracking system. This tool allowed any member of the ATF, regardless of location, to maintain Situational Awareness (SA) and collaborate on flight planning. Unfortunately, as Op LENTUS 17-04 began in short order following the conclusion of LENTUS 17-03, 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD) did not have a chance to centralize this website. As a result, the ATF's Sharepoint was run on an ACCE(E) server, causing increased coordination to effectively manage the site. It is strongly recommended that 1 CAD consider developing a standardized Sharepoint (or similar) collaborative website; this architecture would allow for rapid establishment with centralized hosting; and

- (3) ATF Liaison Officer (LO) positions were established in the affected provincial emergency coordination centres (PREOCs) to present the ATF's capabilities to the user agencies, collect RFEs, and maintain SA. The LOs also provided subject matter expertise to provincial agencies, vetted requests and walked OGDs through the RFE process, greatly reducing the ATF HQ's workload. Though JTFP maintains the RLOs within EMBC, LENTUS 17-04 highlighted the importance of deploying ATF-specific LOs to speak with expertise and help coordinate air-centric missions. It is therefore recommended that ATF LOs be used in all future operations where OGDs lack experience in dealing with the RCAF; and

d. Land Task Force (LTF).

- (1) within the LTF's Area of Operations (AO), significant enhancements to tactical planning were gained through the conduct of daily all-agency coordination meetings (which included RCMP, CAF, BCWS, SAR, and Conservation). Although slow to start, once a steady state was achieved, the meetings became a force multiplier. This type of activity should be commenced at the start of the operation and sustained throughout;
- (2) Tier 3 Firefighting training was conducted at various stages throughout the deployment as a requirement to conduct the task in support of BCWS. Further coordination with BCWS to develop a better understanding of potential theatre mission specific training will assist force generators to determine future requirements; and
- (3) the deployment of a senior LO from 3rd Canadian Division (3rd Cdn Div) sent to JTFP provided the LTF Comd insight as to JTFP's intent. This consideration should be sustained for future operations.

7. Improve. The following key findings should be improved upon in future operations.

- a. JTFP. During the staffing of RFAs, particularly support to the RCMP discussion surrounding the type of support needs to be detailed in nature and define the type of support required. In the case of RFA #2 submitted by the RCMP through the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General, JTFP did not have the opportunity to shape and advise the content of the submission. As a result, the tasks associated with this particular RFA generated considerable discussion centred around Assistance to Law Enforcement (ALEA). In the future, close coordination with all levels of government engaged in the drafting and submission of RFAs is a necessity for the CAF in order to ensure the appropriate allocation of resources and level of training required;

b. JTFP HQ.

- (1) JTFP leverages the Maritime Forces Pacific (MARFAC) Formation during a DOMOP for personnel to fulfill matrixed positions. This concept worked well for many of the functions; however, gaps remained that required external augmentation in order to be filled. This need is amplified during sustained operations featuring significant ground effects. The areas requiring external augmentation include J1, J2, J35, and J8.
 - (a) the lack of J1 hampered personnel issues as it related to reception, staging and onward movement (RSOM) and morale and welfare for deployed personnel;
 - (b)
 - (c) J35 staff within JTFP are sufficient to surge for an operation during the first 72 hours;

greatly assisted with the prolonged nature of the operation; and
 - (d) J8 was engaged late in the process which led to the application of different accounting procedures. These different procedures made cost capturing and financial roll up during post-operation activities difficult. The J8 cell needs to be engaged early and integrate with DOMOP staff to track costs and expenditures throughout all phases of the operation;
- (2) within J3 Operations, there was a notable lack of experience displayed by the personnel selected for the Battle Watch Operations Center (BWOC). It has been noted in the past, and should be implemented going forward, that a rigorous BWOC training plan be implemented for all Formation personnel with the potential to act in a BWOC capacity. Additionally, J3 Operations is tasked with building, displaying, and disseminating SA.

It is

understood that the Joint Battlespace Management Command (JBMC) will be released shortly to the CAF.

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- (3) the topography of the BC interior proved extremely difficult to operate effectively with CAF communication resources. Most elements had to resort to the use of personal cell phones, which at times also proved difficult in areas that had little-to-no coverage. A robust satellite communication system, light-weight and easily deployable should be considered; and

c. ATF.

- (1) throughout the operation, there was an apparent perception throughout the ATF that domestic operations were not executed in the same fashion as international ones. Despite the prescribed C2 and clear issuance of Transfer of Command Authorities (TOCA), various members of the ATF continued to coordinate directly with home units on items such as personnel management, maintenance actions, and airframe swaps. On multiple occasions, Wings contacted the ATF directly to request or influence decisions that were the purview of I CAD or CJOC. ATF members and home units were reminded regularly that the mission should be treated as any other deployed mission, with the JFACC executing OPCOM of all deployed personnel and aircraft on CJOC's behalf. It is recommended that moving forward, this teaching point be included in the syllabus of all RCAF C2 courses; and
- (2) the intent for Op LENTUS 17-04 to have multiple capabilities operating in the JOA as soon as possible was achieved quite admirably, mainly through the pre-positioning of aircraft while awaiting the provincial RFA. The adage of "go big early" was adhered to from an aircraft mix perspective; however, the start state of the HQ and supporting elements were not as similarly robust. As the duration of the mission was unknown (and initially expected to be short), there was perceived pressure, mostly self-generated, to minimize the personnel footprint and not unduly strain FGs. The result was a slow build up to the necessary footprint in key areas (in particular, A1/Admin, A3, CIS, and Maintenance). Had a more robust Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) been initially developed, better support could have been provided earlier. It is, therefore, recommended that future ATFs collaborate with supporting Wings and I CAD staff to develop a robust force structure with all necessary enablers and complete maintenance teams. This, in turn, would be endorsed by the JFACC and approved by CJOC (if applicable);

d. LTF.

- (1) early identification and tasking of LOs to outside organizations is key to success. The most notable example during this operation was an LO to/from the RCMP. It was noted that Military Police (MPs) assigned to this operation were limited to Force Protection and policing of Forces. The use of MPs as RCMP LOs can be crucial to the success of an operation as the shared lexicon from police counterparts can better assist the commander in assessing the requested effects; and
- (2) land use agreements were of concern during this operation in that each department had a separate, distinct set of guidelines and regulations. During Op LENTUS 17-04, the CAF procedures seemed more stringent and drawn out than those of the lead agencies (RFA dependent). For future operations of this nature, the CAF should investigate the possibility to follow the guidelines and regulations established by the Province and lead department.

CONCLUSION

8. Overall, Op LENTUS 17-04 achieved success as a short-notice, CJOC-led DOMOP assisting the Province of British Columbia's civil authorities' efforts in dealing with the wildfires. Great strides were made in reinforcing CAF relationships with outside organizations and in highlighting the CAF's operational and tactical capabilities. The size of the AO and amount of resources required proved a challenge - but ultimately not one that was insurmountable. The constant engagement with OGDs and outside agencies enabled JTFP to accomplish its primary mission.

9. The opportunity to support Canadians at home is an honour for any CAF member. The professionalism and dedication demonstrated by all, including the ATF, LTF, supporting staff and command teams, throughout the mission, did not go unnoticed. We are proud of the accomplishments of our CAF members and thank all those involved that came together to make Op LENTUS 17-04 a success.

// Original Signed by //

Art McDonald
Rear-Admiral
Commander

Annexes (page 8)

Annexes

Annex A - List of References

Annex B - JTFF OP LENTUS LL Observations (RDIMS 749042)

Annex C - LTF OP LENTUS LL Observations (RDIMS 749042)

Annex D - ATF LENTUS LL Observations (RDIMS 749042)

Annex E - OP LENTUS 17-04 Summary Brief (RDIMS 749041)



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Distribution List

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NDHQ C Army Ottawa/Comd

NDHQ C Air Force Ottawa/Comd

NDHQ C Navy Ottawa/Comd

3 Cdn Div HQ Edmonton/Comd/COS

1 Cdn Air Div HQ Winnipeg/Comd/DComd FG/A3

1 Cdn Air Div HQ Det ACCE Esquimalt/OIC

1 Cdn Air Div HQ Det ACCE Halifax/OIC

2 Wg Bagotville/Comd/ CO 2AES

8 Wg Trenton/WComd/WOps O

12 Wg Shearwater/WComd/WOps O

19 Wg Comox/WComd/WOps O

CFAWC Trenton/Comdt

Annex A
6435-3350-1 (JTFP LLSO/RDIMS 745226)
18 December 2017

OP LENTUS 17-04 LIST OF REFERENCES

- A. CDS INITIATING DIRECTIVE FOR OP LENTUS 17-04 08 July 2017
- B. CDS TASKING ORDER OP LENTUS 17-04 10 July 2017
- C. FRAG O 001 CDS TASKING ORDER FOR OP LENTUS 17-04 19 July 2017
- D. CJOC OPERATIONS ORDER – OP LENTUS 17-04 10 July 2017 (RDIMS 435257)
- E. CJOC FRAG ORDER 001 – OP LENTUS 17-04 13 July 2017 (RDIMS 435357)
- F. CJOC FRAG ORDER 002 – OP LENTUS 17-04 17 July 2017 (RDIMS 435641)
- G. CJOC FRAG ORDER 003 – OP LENTUS 17-04 18 July 2017 (RDIMS 435689)
- H. CJOC FRAG ORDER 004 – OP LENTUS 17-04 19 July 2017 (RDIMS 435743)
- I. CJOC FRAG ORDER 005 – OP LENTUS 17-04 3 August 2017 (RDIMS 437072)
- J. CJOC FRAG ORDER 007 – OP LENTUS 17-04 13 September 2017 (RDIMS 439284)
- K. CJOC FRAG ORDER 008 – OP LENTUS 17-04 14 September 2017 (RDIMS 439674)
- L. JTFP OPERATION ORDER – OP LENTUS 17-04 11 July 2017 (RDIMS 680668)
- M. JTFP FRAG ORDER 001 – OP LENTUS 17-04 20 July 2017 (RDIMS 684655)
- N. JTFP FRAG ORDER 002 – OP LENTUS 17-04 25 July 2017 (RDIMS 690237)
- O. JTFP FRAG ORDER 003 – OP LENTUS 17-04 10 August 2017 (RDIMS 694483)
- P. JTFP FRAG ORDER 004 – OP LENTUS 17-04 16 August 2017 (RDIMS 693689)
- Q. JTFP FRAG ORDER 005 – OP LENTUS 17-04 15 September 2017 (RDIMS 710589)
- R. CA TASKING ORDER – OP LENTUS 17-04 12 July 2017
- S. CA FRAGMENTARY ORDER 001 – OP LENTUS 17-04 14 July 2017
- T. CA FRAGMENTARY ORDER 002 – OP LENTUS 17-04 18 July 2017
- U. 1 CAD JFACC OPERATION ORDER OP LENTUS 17-04 (RDIMS 1388017)
- V. 1 CAD JFACC FRAG O 001 OP LENTUS 17-04 (RDIMS 1388017)
- W. 1 CAD JFACC FRAG O 002 OP LENTUS 17-04 (RDIMS 1388017)
- X. 1 CAD JFACC FRAG O 003 OP LENTUS 17-04 (RDIMS 1388017)

ANNEX B to JTRP-LTRUS 17-04 POST OPERATION REPORT
 Lessons Learned
 943-3329/1779 LEO

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Topic (1)	Phase	Originator	Observation/Issue	Explanation/Justification	ITIP	CLDC	OP1
1	PH B - Planning and Prep	J1 Ops	Article Watch personnel were not clearly identified with CTPOs. This led to confusion on initial replacements. Lt. Burtis Watch was willing to see who would check on.	Personnel identified early with CTPO and promulgated rotations.	INTERNAL - Concur		
2	PH B - Planning and Prep	J1 Ops	A firm rotation of personnel was set in place prior to commencement of OP LENTUS. Designated people and their contact information is a priority for shift work, especially when members are standing 12-hour watches.	Assign people to OP LENTUS early in year in order to avoid last minute scrambling and confusion. Have rotation of personnel (with contact info) readily available to BWOC personnel. J1 J1 17: BWDR stood as BWOCM because spot wasn't filled and no contact info was available for personnel able to fill the role. If possible (with more training), BWOCM and BWDR could be a combined position in the event of general recall, getting a hold of people will prove difficult without a list of phone numbers.	INTERNAL - Concur		
3	PH IV - Employment	J1 Ops	There is high turnover with the (former) officers manning the BWOC during OP LENTUS.	Assign former naval officers from fleet (ships) to OP LENTUS, using a 4 day and 4 day off rotation (8 people total), and give them time off before and after OP. *This requires forethought from agencies that assign CTPOs (i.e. Personnel Coordination Center)	INTERNAL - Concur		
4	PH IV - Employment	J3 Ops	BWOCM (LCM/LEHM), BWDR (pre-ORD LEHM) and BWDRS (SL) man the BWOC @ night (1800-0600), but there is minimal work to do (eg. Updating sites, monitoring websites/news, manning phone, etc.)	L. Better BWDR or BWOCM could man BWOC during night shift, assisted by 1 MS/PO3 level MCO/PLA trained member. If situation escalates, BWOCM/BWDR could be on call and recalled into BWOC. 2. Have someone from BOC who is already on watch to monitor BWOC and have occasions to call BWOCM or BWDR (eg. emergencies, doubt, etc.)	INTERNAL - This is operation dependent however standard templates for manning and TOIs will be included in the BWOC SOP.		
5	PH B - Planning and Prep	J1 Ops	The BWDR position is challenging to fill as a junior rated officer, because we're bombarded by army terms, plans and STREPs, and we're the central POC for many organizations.	Have an army officer fill the position of BWDR	INTERNAL - Concur		
6	Doctrine	J2 Ops	Efforts on intelligence products were duplicated.	Review B BWOC (Article Watch Operations Center) staff to check with CTPOs on products that exist for Operations to avoid duplicating efforts, and that it is reflected in SOP.	CLDC/Supporting Comd IMPROVE - Sync with higher and supporting HQs within the staff to ensure efficiency in the development of supporting products		
7	Training	J3 Ops	Things for brief composition were not met.	Things will be re-enforced at the beginning of the day and the Command Update Brief (CUB) will have restricted access until it can be put onto the OP LENTUS share point. Things to be re-enforced via email MLI L100.	INTERNAL - Concur		
8	Training	J3 Ops	Information is not consolidated.	Recommend consolidating the various reports to one location - the Sharepoint. All reports and outputs should be available here: i.e. Personnel, IL, PPTs, contact lists, relevant documents, and links. This could be achieved by having various tabs established on the Sharepoint.	CLDC IMPROVE - Identification of common look for use within CLDC for a DOMOP. Must be UNCLAS to work with partner agencies		
9	Training	J3 Ops	RFI (request for information) system is limited in its usefulness.	Recommend integrating the RFI tracker so that once the information is inputted and saved it is also exported to the relevant parties.	CLDC IMPROVE - Common tool		
10	Doctrine	J3 Ops	Point of Contact (POC)/ Office of Primary Interest (OPI)/ Subject Matter Expert (SME) are not always readily apparent.	Create a list of key personnel and contacts, especially those that relate to contingency operations	INTERNAL - Concur		
11	Material & Equipment	J3 Ops	Prior to the BWOC being stood up, the SWO had to manually enter all of the road obstacles, excursions orders and alerts and update all of the fire information. In less than a week, this had accumulated to over 53 files. Once the BWOC was stood up and established, they took over this function.	Recommend continuing with this change	INTERNAL - Concur		

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ANNEX B to IRTA/JRNL/13-04 POST OPERATION REPORT
 Version 1 Limited
 6437-3330 (JTFP ILI2)

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Task Unit DOCS/PHI	Phase	Originator	Observation/Issue	Recommendation / Solution	JTFP	CI/CC	OP
12	PH II - Planning and Prep	J3 Ops	There was a shortage of Victory/BWOC passes available for all of the staff employed in the BWOC on 15 Jul 17. As it stands right now (13 Aug) there are only 11 V passes available to be issued by NCCQ/PassR as required.	(NCCQ) Day Staff to investigate possibility of more passes being held in NCCQ/PHI	JTFP INTERNAL IMPROVE - BDOC to generate additional visitor passes		
13	PH IV - Employment	J3 Ops	During the morning a BWOC staff member came onto the BDOC (PH watch floor and asked to sit at the "round table" to do some reading. After a few minutes he was joined by another BWOC staff member. They began chatting which caused an unnecessary disturbance on the watch floor which distracted BDOC (PH) staff from their work and drowned out the sound of the news broadcast.	BWOC personnel should be briefed to respect the work environment of the BDOC (PH) Watch Floor. Also the SMO should not hesitate to enforce a high standard of professionalism on the BDOC (PH) Watch Floor and not allow it to become an overflow "hangout" for BWOC personnel.	INTERNAL - Concer		
14	PH II - Preparation	J3 Ops	There was no read room for the BW Comd or BW DW.	The Battle Watch is stood up at least once a year and a template for the BW Comd and BW Comd should be made available for Battle Rhythm, Reporting, Tracking, Briefing and Communication.	INTERNAL - Concer		
15	PH II - Planning and Prep	J3 Ops/J6	The sources used to maintain the COP, mainly those related to the number of vehicles, new vehicles, and other statistics have been primarily originating from the open-source BC Warfare Service website. This source has turned out to be lacking as it is not regularly updated or consistently accurate. There are no clear alternatives as there have been no clear files (readers received reports and returns) to obtain real-time or near real-time updates from appropriate partner agencies.	Recommend that SOPs, MODUs, and other systems be established for OP LENTUS events to better fit appropriate agencies to maximize information sharing. This could include shared COP pictures through a joint website, BWOC access to PECC, FC, GOC, PREOC or other agency systems, or another means for statistics, data, or other pertinent updates to be shared with the BWOC and other organizations with a stake in the operational subject matter. Something that goes beyond simple refreshing of web-pages.	CI/CC IMPROVE - Requirement to establish tools for use with the WOC and Partners to ensure that the CAF share a COP within a DDMOP Framework		
16	PH IV - Employment	J3 Ops	BC Warfare Site for current and active fires is only guaranteed to be updated once daily at midnight (ATV gas site)	Recommend BW Comd not refresh BC Warfare site for current and active fire pages	INTERNAL - Concer		
17	PH IV - Employment	J3 Ops	Verbiage used in the SITREP was incorrect and "the LTF was evacuating Anahim Lake with the ICHEP". Predicate language must be used when issuing the 12 hour SITREP	If you are unsure of the situation as it is developing investigate the scenario prior to the sitrep going out. Use precise language to ensure you do not confuse personnel receiving the SITREP include the following: - Overall statement on the growth (or lack thereof) of fire in general - Outline of the key areas of interest (2-3 fire of note, forest growth, fire of strategic interest no our best down area) - Statistics we updates - Events which may affect the plans of AT/ or LTF (ie moving an evc order to the right, potentially affecting the RYMO, crew rest, maintenance, etc)	INTERNAL - Concer		
18	PH IV - Employment	J3 Ops	Commander's intent or direction	Overall statement on the growth (or lack thereof) of fire in general - Outline of the key areas of interest (2-3 fire of note, forest growth, fire of strategic interest no our best down area) - Statistics we updates - Events which may affect the plans of AT/ or LTF (ie moving an evc order to the right, potentially affecting the RYMO, crew rest, maintenance, etc)	INTERNAL - Concer		
19	PH II - Planning and Prep	J3 Ops	ORCs and directors that stand as BWDOR and BWOCM aren't familiar with OP LENTUS, and need training/briefs when they arrive to BWOC. Training and briefs should occur before the testing commences.	Send SARES to this OR have designated personnel sent to BWOC in order to receive a mission brief to include Battle Rhythm, CSR format, format of Ops Room/BWOC and D1007, and to receive answers to questions before OP gets too busy	INTERNAL - Concer		
20	PH III - Deployment	J3 Ops	DP-100 is not configured to go just operation in an efficient manner. All elements that consists JTFP (BDOC, BWOC, ACCPI) and JBCC and not co-located. With the high tempo of operation and information the job configuration cause information sharing gaps with a proper table routine was established.	Send SARES to this OR have designated personnel sent to BWOC in order to receive a mission brief to include Battle Rhythm, CSR format, format of Ops Room/BWOC and D1007, and to receive answers to questions before OP gets too busy	CI/CC/ADHQ/IR - Long-term issue to develop a project for a purpose best building. In the interim there is a requirement to make the best use of the available facilities.		
21	PH I - Warning	J3 Ops	JTFP has no dedicated personnel to be employed as IMO. JTFP was lucky to have a lady read IMO within the HQ that could leverage this deficiency gap. The activation of the JTFP Op Lencas web page would not have been set up and no COP would have been set up	Add to 1 Cdn DW HQ the pers and the line of tasking to go the effort during a Dem Ops.			

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ANNEX B to RTR-JL7474 17 de 18 POST OPERATION REPORT
 Unrevised Version
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Task No (B31M, P1)	Obj	Org	Original	Control/Owner	Recommendations/Solutions	ITIP	EOC	OP
22	Organization PH III - Deployment	J3 Ops	J3 Ops	JTF HQ has only the integral capability to provide C2 for a short period for some tasks. Assessments from all over the CAF were sent to JTF HQ to get the management of the 133 Cdn (BWOC). Some units had no expertise to work in an Operational HQ and the Situation Centre function. 1 Cdn Div HQ has retention experts that could be employed to go the C2 during Dawn Ops.	add to 1 Cdn Div HQ the arms and the line of talking to go the effort during a Dawn Ops.	COCC - As it is unlikely to reach into the high readiness Div for tasks, there needs to be a standing expectation of implementation requirements for JTFP in a land exerts DD/MOP		
23	Doctrine PH III - Deployment	J3	J3	CD's First in last out is a paradigm doctrinal shift. If we are no longer a force of last resort, the RLQ program could easily be increased in size. For example, sending them 20 to 30 members will allow this group to provide a flow of trained LOs to the province while being a cost effective initiative that will have a representation at the EOC's. Looking forward when the need for an RFA is imminent become a question of balance and lead. A more robust RLQ program will provide both the capacity engage early to sustain itself in time by having a larger pool of volunteers.	increase the each personnel training in CA for the program.	COCC - Support the investment of resources in the RLQ program to ensure a robust capability able to conduct liaison and assist in planning		
24	Organization PH II - Planning and Prep	J4	J4	There was confusion WRT supplying personnel with rations	Recommended SOPs are reviewed to ensure direction is from senior personnel and that it clear (who is eating, when are they entitled). It is also recommended that a small amount of extra rations be available just in case.	INTERNAL - Concur		
25	Leadership PH II - Preparation	J4	J4	Food services did not match need	Many a list of incrementally tasked personnel with those who have a small assignment/requirement.	INTERNAL - Concur		
26	Organization PH IV - Employment	J4	J4	No personnel available during weekend to pick up bin handles.	Extra personnel be identified for administrative tasks.	INTERNAL - Concur		
27	Training PH II - Planning and Prep	J4	J4	After two weeks of activation, BWOC PME supplies were exhausted and supplies were provided by RMC. Each operation centers were low on equipment (ROCPY personnel conducted a resupply of inventory)	Sustainment plan and dispersed storesman should be identified to facilitate the resupply of PME and other required equipment.	INTERNAL - Concur		
28	Personnel PH II - Planning and Prep	J4	J4	BWOC Log Duty Officers did not always have the requisite knowledge to perform routine functions for incoming jets (bank flight, accommodations, rations) which then required RDC staff intervention.	IMPROVE - Recommend the BWOC Log Duty Log include detailed step-by-step instructions for certain commonly expected tasks in conjunction with sourcing personnel who are Logistics Officers at OPA.	INTERNAL - Concur		
29	Material & Equipment PH IV - Employment	J4	J4	Contracting Services were initially being sought / utilized locally (Lumbago / Williams Lubs), as well as with BLOC orgs in both Edmonton and Equinox, and PWC in Victoria / Vancouver. Most of the contracts were eventually transferred to Equinox closer to the end of the op to facilitate a central POC for dispatching the contracts, which made this process easier to accomplish and monitor for completion.	SUSTAIN - sharing contracting OPA POC information with all players early in the op allowed for, when required, direct liaison between the customer, service provider and the DND/PSPC contracting org which allowed a smoother service all round. J4-1 was kept in the loop via CC's emails and was able to update the contracting register accordingly	INTERNAL - Concur		
30	Training PH V - Reemployment	J4	J4	Miscalculation of web heights led to BLOC TRAME providing inadequate transportation assets being assigned to pick up vehicles. The field to return them to their originating unit, which ended up costing extra time and resources.	IMPROVE - Recommend that a detailed analysis of movement op and load tables be performed prior to deployment of loading / transportation platforms.	COCC/CA - JTFP J4 needs to base closely with the CA when planning and conducting support to land based operations		
31	Material & Equipment PH II - Planning and Prep	J4	J4	Some Forward Air Replenishment Points (FARPs) were not pre-planned or record prior to OP (ERTUS, which delayed the reestablishment of same in some areas of the AO).	IMPROVE - Recommend increased reconnaissance (air/land) in these areas of central BC, especially in light of the potential normality of annual summer wildfires in Central / South Eastern BC.	JTFP/ACE(P) - Concur		
33	Organization PH II - Preparation	J6	J6	All 'Y' positions were not equipped with positional DWAN accounts.	Recommend the creation of positional accounts for all stakeholders.	INTERNAL - Concur		

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ANNEX B to JTFP-LENTUS 17-06 POST OPERATION REPORT
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 6415-3380 (JTFP 1502)

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Task ID	Task Description	Priority	Originator	OSI Information/Issue	Recommendations / Solutions	ETFP	CADC	CRP
34	Material & Equipment PH II - Deployment	16	16	SATCOM systems deployed were not without verification of functionality. This resulted in delays in establishing data communications outside of employing DPMH. This required the deployment of the GATE from the Sig Bn. In addition, some jets were deployed with missing hardware or software, and were in some instances N/S. Unable to monitor all open source information relevant to wildlife management and emergency response	IMPROVE - Regular COMMSTATE received between JTFP HQ and 3 Div HQ in order to avoid delays in the provision of data comm. R2 will enhance a plan for a standardized comm check for all comms systems within MAPAC and 3 Div including SATCOM and lower based comms systems. Install GP Net workstation so that every video, and especially Twitter, could be monitored for updates/mentions on wildlife information. This would also be relevant in other BWOC events such as general natural disasters or SAR	INTERNAL - Concept		
35	Material & Equipment PH II - Planning and Prep	16	16	A review of REDM and SATCOM systems within Western Canada is required to ensure appropriate numbers of REDM/SATCOM systems are available for deployment on DOM/OPS. Due to the nature of the topography in Western Canada, VHF and cell communications can be unreliable or non viable in certain areas of BC. This satcom phase systems become a relatively dependable means of voice communications. A VHF all informed net was precarious at times, and proved to be non-effective. Although a VHF net was established, due to the topography and capabilities of this comms system, it proved to be non-reliable/non-effective and did not have the range to maintain a VHF all informed net. This caused some issues with the passing of information in areas where cell coverage was questionable or non-existent, but did not directly affect C2 to a point where comms were lost.	IMPROVE - JTFP R2 to coordinate plans for the provision of systems for both Ops with 3 Div 06 and DCL. CADC/IS - Investigate portable options for network comms			
36	Material & Equipment PH IV - Employment	16	16	Class C Repservet Fw was delayed due to inexperience at the 38 unit, but would have been delayed otherwise because of time the process takes to establish financial coding by CAP, and activation within RPSL.	IMPROVE - JTFP R2 to investigate the availability to a "push to talk" REDM all informed net capability. Otherwise the deployment of a large number of R2 jets will be required to establish and maintain an all informed VHF net.			
37	Material & Equipment PH IV - Employment	16	16	JTFP has no dedicated Civilian Admin and Finance employees. MAPAC currently supports JTFP activities, but large contingent operations such as LENTUS can significantly increase activity, and often over the summer leave period. Pressures and time lag in admin and finance response has created errors in coding, and made validation difficult/ time consuming, which increases pressure on staff. Operations with high media attention such as LENTUS often lead to an increase in ITAs and OPOs (OPQ 3155 as an example), which are difficult to respond to when trying to track expenditures that have been SAV'd.	LESSONS LEARNED: 18 staff have new knowledge regarding process for paying Class C Repservets. IMPROVE: Involve all in writer in the planning process would ensure more comprehensive SUPPORT sections in the OP ORDER, and allow sufficient time to organize financial coding for timely payment of Invoicing/Repservets.	INTERNAL - Concept		
38	Personnel PH II - Preparation	18	18	Class C Repservet Fw was delayed due to inexperience at the 38 unit, but would have been delayed otherwise because of time the process takes to establish financial coding by CAP, and activation within RPSL.	SUPPORT: With more active involvement in planning at every phase, 18 could better recommend mitigation strategy for high workload, low manning periods. IMPROVE: JTFP will again request creation/handling of CR-04 position at D119 2020.			
39	Organization PH II - Preparation	18	18	Class C Repservet Fw was delayed due to inexperience at the 38 unit, but would have been delayed otherwise because of time the process takes to establish financial coding by CAP, and activation within RPSL.				
40	Material & Equipment PH IV - Employment	18	18	MAPAC was an after thought during the operation. The demand for and request of MAPAC support should be more pronounced.	Include MAPAC on R1 checklist	INTERNAL - Concept		
41	Material & Equipment PH IV - Employment	18	18	Provide support for MAPAC during the operation.	A MAPAC/CHC RMA SIME should be identified to provide support to JTFP operations.	INTERNAL - Concept		

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ANNEX 6 to JTFP-LENTUS 17 air HOST OPERATION REPORT
 Lessons Learned
 6435-338 (JTFP L16)

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Task List (O/M/P)	Phase	Dr g major	Objectives/Issues	Recommendations/Solutions	JIOC	OP
43	PH IV - Employment	JRgr	There is some confusion within JTFP and, to a lesser extent, OP Ops with regard to which engineer performs which roles during routine and domestic operations. In other words, what functions are performed by the CD RP Ops and the JTFP knowing that the following three engineering functions must be accomplished: Senior Engineer, Engineer Advisor to Comd JTFP, and Engineer Planner/Staff Officer. During OP LENTUS, CD RP Ops acted as the Senior Engineer and Engineer Advisor to Comd JTFP while the JTFP was the Engineer Planner/Staff Officer.	<p>INTERNAL - Concur</p> <p>My recommendations is to amend how the distributions of tasks was executed during OP LENTUS. In other words I recommend the following structure for both routine and domestic operations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Senior Engineer - CD RP Ops - Engineer Advisor to Comd JTFP - JTFP - Engineer Planner/Staff Officer - JTFP 		
44	PH IV - Employment	JRgr	JTFP did not incorporate the JIS/JIS role on OP LENTUS which resulted in reactive and, in most cases, mitigated planning efforts. For example, there was an opportunity to conduct a JOPG for the potential evacuation of the HWY 20 corridor WEST to BELLA COOLA. Instead, "JIS" (2x Army Corps) efforts were focused on finding alternate camp locations for the LTF who had already made arrangements for establishing camp at BRKE CREEK. In sum:	<p>INTERNAL - Concur</p> <p>Requires training and identification of detachable staff to fulfil the planning functions</p> <p>Originator of JIS (called JOC earlier) had dedicated planners (JOC optimal - JOPG required) from the continental staff, and advisors (NSG, Legal, Engg, etc) is required.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. BUJ: JIS received/joint verbal planning guidance (interest, timelines, etc.) from J1. 2. Immediately after BRK: Planning team meets in pre-identified planning area to receive guidance from JIS. 3. CIB: JIS update to Comd on planning efforts and linkages for future which (situation, mission analysis, information, decision, etc). JIS receives planning guidance from Comd/J3. 		
46	Personnel	JHSS	Pre-deployment screening for members without medical employment limitations was largely waived by CDC. Screening requirements for follow-on forces was not clarified. Several Res Brigades completed some form of medical screening, however, this was highly variable.	<p>INTERNAL - Concur</p> <p>Follow on orders should clarify medical screening requirements if initially waived. Alternate forms of medical screening for reserves are currently being reviewed by Health Services including RUMQ form.</p>		
47	Material & Equipment	JHSS	While the IRU held PPE stores required for this type of Op - the Force Health Protection units were not RH Tested.	<p>CDC - Concur</p> <p>All per Force Health Protection - Recommended all parts on IRU be RH Tested routinely. RH testing should be incorporated into pre-deployment training for all segments/follow-on forces.</p>		
48	Material & Equipment	JHSS	Medical resupply was outstanding. All requested supplies were sent expeditiously and received without problem from Edmonston. As well, JTFP J4 obtained appropriate PPE both from IRU stores as well as on the economy.	<p>INTERNAL/RES - Concur</p> <p>Maintain buffer stock with future dem ops.</p>		
49	Material & Equipment	JHSS	LSVV ambulances were frequently HS and unable to keep pace within convoys with other LTF-P vehicles. Because of this, the LSVV ambulances were used only for non-urgent transport and static med support. Civilian EMS were relied upon to transport any serious patients.	<p>INTERNAL/RES - Concur</p> <p>increase number of civilian pattern/F430 Ambis for domestic ops especially with large geographical distances and highways between medical treatment facilities.</p>		
50	Material & Equipment	JHSS	While no secure means of communications between the LTF HSS and JTF P-HSS, situation improved when DPMN available.	<p>INTERNAL/RES - Concur</p> <p>Establish early secure comms for passage of confidential medical information.</p>		

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AM22 8 10 114-18716.13-04 POST DEPARTURE REPORT
 Liaison Command
 645-3328 (177-1152)

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Code (in DO/11/18/1)	Phase	Originator	Observation/Issue	Recommendations/Solutions	JIPP	CNSC	GM
51	PH V - Redeployment	JRSS	<p>No formal medical pre-clearance procedures prior to departing theatre made post deployment medical screening challenging. Frequent tips from various locations required post deployment medical screening to be conducted upon arrival at home base. Several emails required about medical screening requirements and redeployment order was issued.</p>	<p>Common pre-clearance procedures including US requirements recommended. Re-deployment order issued early to allow arrangements at home base if required.</p>	<p>INTERBAM/PSS - Cancer</p>		

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Annex C to the LANTN 17 Co HQS Comparison Report
 (S/N 1702 000 123)

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Task ID	Phase	Objective	Operational/Aviation	Support/Status/Subject	ITF / ATC Comment	QIR
1	AI - Personnel	Preparation	ATF HQ	AI was not assigned during the initiation phase	There must be an AI assigned at the start to ensure the flow of personnel from the OP, as well as to ensure, if conducted efficiently, that a number of personnel are available for the OP and its	IE-1 CAO Pg. 2 Wing
2	LO's	Preparation	ATF HQ	Continuing interplay among various personnel responsibilities related to LO's being able to reach the OP. The LO's were not assigned during the initiation phase. The LO's did not understand their relationship beyond duty and some communication was not clear.	Agreed. LO's are critical to the success of the OP and must be clearly defined. The LO's should have a minimum amount of training and communication to ensure they understand their relationship beyond duty and some communication was not clear.	IE-1 CAO
3	OP and Handover	Preparation	ATF HQ	All tasks highlighted in the main document, the amount of resources in personnel was not enough to support the AT at all levels. From the AC, who had to train a new operator to the HQ that had to train new LO's and new ID's. In addition, many problems did not have sufficient handover. In many instances a person would arrive to the afternoon and the person they were replacing had their night or the next day.	There was too frequent and could have been managed better. Adequate handover was not provided. However, will depend on personnel.	AG-1 CAO AG-2 Wing
4	Blackberry	Preparation	ATF HQ	Personnel reported all over the HQ the use of DND based blackberries was not used for LO's per unit as mentioned in the document - which means their personal phones had to be used for work. This is not a requirement for this unit (not all) and requirements to bring your device is very poor.	Agreed. Access to Blackberry capability is critical to a number of LO's and not having LO's capable of this response is a major issue.	MF 36 / ATF HQ
5	DMMI Laptop with remote access	Preparation	ATF HQ	Use of personnel in the HQ had very little access to DMMI and the crewed some tasks, as the Op dependent was the local point for information and it became very difficult to ensure that the most current and up to date information was distributed to the relevant personnel.	Agreed. However, it is the suggested IT's that need to ensure this capability. Not just ACCS, which need access to the resources.	ITP
6	Accommodations	Preparation	ARW RW MSE DC	Environment was identified as primary area for emergency in that part of AC. Between CORPUS HANDBOOK and possible future LENTUS, the facility was identified as a high priority. The facility was not up to date. Limited working office space and limited access. Limited showers, no accommodations and the lack of food and facilities made it difficult to operate from this location.	Agree. With enhancements, the facility would be a great location to setup in the future.	IF Ops ITP CAC
7	Meeting instructions	Preparation	ARW RW MSE DC	Meeting instructions were not distributed which caused several questions on what to expect from departing members. People did not know what to do.	Agreed. Meeting instructions for AI in relation to the OP should be distributed for all personnel in the OP/CO/ACC/OPS for the OP/CO/ACC/OPS.	IE-1 AI IE-1 CAO
8	LO Contact P	Preparation	ARW RW MSE DC	A single duty phone should be assigned to each LO. The LO's should be able to reach their phone through their phone which changed with each new LO.	Agreed. ACCS should have each LO and LO MAs with set phone numbers and personal email accounts. These numbers should remain static for the Op.	AG-2 Wing
9	ICBT accounts	Preparation	ARW RW MSE DC	Many members did not have ICBT accounts prior to arriving in Thetford.	Agreed. Unfortunately, ICBT was not used in the OP. However, it should be a requirement for all personnel in the OP.	AG-2 Wing
10	Course support	Preparation	ARW RW MSE DC	Course support and training was assigned later into the Operation, which caused some confusion and a lack of interest in the course.	Agreed. Course support should be considered as a high priority. It should be provided to all personnel in the OP.	AG-2 Wing 1 CAO
11	LPO	Preparation	ARW RW MSE DC	ITP did not have ready access to the OP, but the staff's arrival and departure was not coordinated with the OP.	Agreed. Access to the OP is a requirement for all personnel in the OP.	AG-1 CAO
12	ACCES and Augmentation	Deployment	ATF HQ	The structure of ACCES (P) differs from that of an AOC and was not clearly defined. The structure of ACCES (P) differs from that of an AOC and was not clearly defined. The structure of ACCES (P) differs from that of an AOC and was not clearly defined.	Agreed. Augmentation should be considered as a high priority. It should be provided to all personnel in the OP.	AG-2 Wing

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ANALYSE DE SENSIBILITE D'UN PROJET DE LOI
Sensitization Analysis of a Bill
DND/MSD 0000-0000

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Topic (in Colloquial)	Phase	Document	Classification	Summary of Findings/Conclusions	ATP / ATU Comments	CPA
13	Link	Deployment	ARW RW	Learning loop-to-loop with BC vehicles. Services performed in Williams (LH) was necessary to publish the test of the program. The top-to-top provided their OTC resources to the test of the program and clarified the testing process for the program support.	It is essential to meet with the leadership of all levels of various organizations, as well as to meet with the leadership of the program support. This will ensure the program is understood in the future.	RE - ATU ARW, LH
14	Integration	Deployment	ATP BOWS LO	Concerns related to the program. In this case, BOWS for the program. The program is to be integrated for the program. The program is to be integrated for the program. The program is to be integrated for the program.	General level of work very provided to program at this beginning, and then we worked intensively with crews swapped out. Approval also provided with program support when positioned at forward operating locations.	RE - ARW
15	Vehicle Launch/ATU Card	Deployment	ARW RW MSE OC	When arrived in theater and initial crew were engaged through HQ, an individual claims. As members of the program, they were engaged through HQ, an individual claims. As members of the program, they were engaged through HQ, an individual claims. As members of the program, they were engaged through HQ, an individual claims.	The topics in this requirement to have information on the ground who can establish the program. The program is to be integrated for the program. The program is to be integrated for the program. The program is to be integrated for the program.	RE - CAD RE - AL, comments
16	Flight Planning Tools	Deployment	ARW RW CHMS DTDC	BOWS had a software issue of repair times tracking for BOWS, as well as the information tracked into one site. Available software requires high performance. It was not clear what the issue was. The program is to be integrated for the program. The program is to be integrated for the program. The program is to be integrated for the program.	It is important to find and share information both early on and throughout. These events should be emphasized early on during the deployment.	RE - CS, ARW
17	Deployment	Deployment	ARW RW	When establishing an ATP to conduct the program, the manager checklist includes - if available software and are performance elements that need to be considered in the program.	While not required to complete the program, it is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program.	RE - CAD
18	Workload	Deployment	ARW RW U, ARW	Use of equipment support facilities. In addition, staff facilities, a good and should be used again if required.	Workload for before missions in the program. It is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program.	ATU
19	Communications	Employment	ATU HQ	Communications with ATU crew from their own work with different means. Staff facilities were used for the program. The program is to be integrated for the program. The program is to be integrated for the program. The program is to be integrated for the program.	Approved. CS report needs to be included in ATU HQ. It is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program.	RE - RW RE - CAD
20	Support	Employment	ATU HQ - NODD	Use of equipment support facilities. In addition, staff facilities, a good and should be used again if required.	When a national (CAD) is required, it is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program.	RE - CAD ATU ARW
21	FG Missions	Employment	ARW RW	Use of equipment support facilities. In addition, staff facilities, a good and should be used again if required.	When a national (CAD) is required, it is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program. It is good to have a plan of the program.	RE - RW ARW

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Form C-10 (Rev. 2016) 1-1-16 POST CONSULTATION REPORT
 1000-1000 (Form C-10)

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Topic or Subtopic	Phase	Organization	Division or Sub-Division	Responsible Authority / Job Title	ITR / AIT Comment	Case	QA
Treasury of materials to SAC	Deployment	NW ACP U. Inc			<p>The process went well due to the skills of the person involved. However, there was no clearly established direction for how to maintain the system, nor the incident routing process to the SAC. This should be added into the SOP for future ops.</p>		78-3 1/2

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C-10

Annex D to ITPA/LEPTUS 13-06 POST OPERATION REPORT
 Lessons Learned
 6435-3700 (ITPP UL01)

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Task ID / GOV/UNIT	Phase	Co-ordinator	Observations/Issues	Successes/Functions / Solutions	ITPP	OUIC	GR
1	RFA	Deployment	Significant pressure to deploy was imposed despite agencies identifying that they were not prepared to receive elements. Strategic effect was achieved, however procedural requirements, i.e. LUAL and requirements to support road repairs could not be completed using proper procedures.	Improve communication and understanding of RFA jobs and benefits	INTERNAL - Concur		
2	RFA	Phase 1	All requests were made for the specific, i.e. asking for 200-300 tonnes of material. This was not possible due to limited stockpiles. The amount of material requested was not realistic. The amount of material requested was not realistic. The amount of material requested was not realistic.	Request the effect, and after FOTFE define appropriate resourcing	ITPP/GR/OUIC: Concur improve with building relationships with OGDs and partners COZ/ITP: Set portable camera system for donations		
3	Convoys	Deployment	As the RFA came down in the middle of a heavy black and grey rain, marshalling personnel resources was extremely difficult. Many resources personnel, such as Ops O, Int O and OC Advise Coy are 1 of 1, so they had to be called off of leave. This coupled with the direction that "no financial commitments be linked" made it impossible to fill the TD and E without impacting other projects/gateway training and events. This is currently manifesting itself in increased/heightened tempo as the other employment based longer than on OP LEPTUS has, historically, numerous RFA occurred while in theater.	Request the effect, and after FOTFE define appropriate resourcing	COZ/ITP: Concur for longer duration COZ/OUIC through multiple RFA will be required		
4	Preparation - Battle Procedures	Organization	COZ/OUIC - All Agency Meetings conducted daily drastically improved coordination amongst all agencies (ICAMP, CAF, BCWS, SAR and Conservation Officers).	Request the effect, and after FOTFE define appropriate resourcing	INTERNAL - Concur		
5	Coord with other Agencies	Employment	Use of job up tracks was a benefit when establishing OGDs. The job up made the troops alert in with the local population, allowing for a more peaceful entry / approach when dealing with aggressive locals.	SUSTAIN - These meetings allowed 12 Jan 04 to occur directly with RCMP, PWS, SAR, and Conservation Officers to ensure their efforts were always supporting one another. These meetings resulted in direct communications and developed working relationships between key players.	INTERNAL - Concur		
6	Transportation	Prog and Planning	Environmental remediation information, and Real Property Land Use Agreements were misaligned during hand over of the Envo Trm and the Real Prop Officers during the E. The regular (weekly) change of staff made tracking what sites were not cleared and which had remediation requirements very difficult to complete.	SUSTAIN - The job up tracks established greater frequency of communication for the troops on OGDs. There were many roads where OGDs with other couldn't access, or would damage and require repairs. The UTR also set on an aggressive posture which prevented an aggressive posture when dealing with locals.	COZ/ITP: Concur and RFA applicable for other RFA's		
7	Real Property / Environment	Employment	When a OGD have generated Rangers for Op LEPTUS, they also sent on Mid rank families with their administration.	SUSTAIN - Maintain a single POC for Environmental Concerns and Real Property (LUA). By not mapping out on a regular basis, continuity will be obtained and facilitate easier tracking of Envo / Property concerns. A detailed tracker should be created at the beginning of the Operation and maintained (with proper handover) throughout to Small loss of information	INTERNAL - Concur		
8	Rangers	Prog and Planning		Request the effect, and after FOTFE define appropriate resourcing	COZ/ITP - Concur		

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Annex D to JTF-LINTUS 13-04 POST OPERATION REPORT
 L'annexe D au Rapport d'après Opérations JTF-LINTUS 13-04

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Topic (et COTE/ET)	Phase	Signature	Characteristics/Notes	Recommendations / Solutions	JTF	COC	OM
9	Post Movement	Deployment	1 COU / 1 Sec IM / 3 PPCI DUTIES / LEAVING JOB - Throughout Op LINTUS, there were a number of situations where soldiers from EDMONTON or BC drove to WILLIAMS LAKE without knowledge of anyone from the JTF. There were several instances where troops and supplies ended up in the AO from the Force Generator without knowledge or explanation.	IMPROVE - Deploying personnel without authority communicating details (departure time, numbers, etc.) makes tracking personnel very difficult for the JTF. When a person or organization deploys to joining the JTF, a message must be sent through the Chain of Command so that the JTF can prepare for their arrival. While the mechanism was clear from the 3 Dr orders (and reinforced by the Force Generator), a more granular rule must be taken by the JTF at the beginning of the Op. The AO must be completed. As well, personnel who are being sent into the AO should be briefed by the Force Generator on who and where they are to report.			
10	Coord with other agencies	Pre and Planning	1 CER FEEDBACK - MACP Coord structure is not set up to operate for large scale operations.	IMPROVE - We must seek to LO with strong skills in planning and also interpersonal skills to work with RCAF on large scale operations. Identify a Major or AOC Captain should be embedded in their planning cell as an LO.			
11	Ac. Material	Resources - Vehicle and Equipment	1 Sec IM Responsibilities for JTF are support requirements were not clearly identified between JTF-P and JTF-W for support to the UT. Particularly when it comes to constructing and delivering FG Cartridges of 1 OAGP.	We need a clear support dependency matrix that defines responsibilities between JTF-P and JTF-W for each category of supply and services for the land task force.	INTERNAL - Cancel		
12	Ac. Material	Resources - Vehicle and Equipment	1 Sec IM JTF-P only assumed contracting responsibilities early on through the operation, leading to confusion and difficulties with clearing contracts. Due to the requirements for the UT to establish contracts in line with JTF-P contracts being in place, the support staff on the ground was unable to focus on supporting troops forward.	JTF-P could have taken contracting support sooner. JTF-P should coordinate with WRT contracting responsibilities. JTF-P should consider including a deployable contracting capability. Contracts should be in place from JTF-P or CO P/CDSB EAM.	INTERNAL - Cancel		
13	Preparation, Battle Procedure	Material	3 PPCI The GEO cell was able to produce maps that were well suited for planning and operational SA in a CP but the terrain on the ground required more detailed maps. The best map was the "Back Roads Map Base" which allowed for detailed route planning.	GEO Cell was incapable, and is a "stop" for any DOMOP. There will still be a requirement for LPO Maps, however, and this must be rethought.	INTERNAL - Cancel		
14	Resources - Vehicle and Equipment	Material	3 PPCI Searching for the ground flow of IAT and direct vehicles became an issue. ROT remains the issue the ground force produced all available jerry cans in the AO. Further concerning the initial fuel requirements was the fact that many remote gas stations would not accept the government AM card.	Recommended fuel cards for each PL, WFO and Coy CO. All vehicles should be placed on providing status cards for COU Ops in remote areas.	INTERNAL - Cancel		
15	Resources - Vehicle and Equipment	Material	3 PPCI Available military communication were unreliable, and hindered the operational effectiveness of the forces deployed in OP LINTUS. The only piece of military specific data base equipment was the use of the facility, which was used for the first time on OP LINTUS and only used a few times. The bandwidth required to connect with high speed data is not available. As well, the communications plan "voice and data" required the use of private cell phones and "group text" to ensure SA. SAT Phones did help but there was not enough of them, they did not always work, and held up "all informed text" function.	Recommended using 137 radios and authorizing the use of SAT comms (requests through military radios). VHF and HF are not a viable communication option given the reported distances, terrain and reliability issues. Data bases that are held at the levels higher than the unit level to ensure availability. As well, communication must be checked regularly to ensure availability. As well, the capability of having the reporting requirements of a DOMOP must be understood.	COC/JTF - Cancel An overall reliability and robust comms framework must be available for use on DOMOPs		

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Annex D to JTFP-LENTUS 17-08 POST OPERATION REPORT
Lessons Learned
6435-3350/JTFP LL50

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Table 17-1 DDI/17-171	Theme	Organization	Or process	Operational Theme	Success indicators / Outcomes	JTFP	COC	CIP
16	Preparation - Lethal Procedures	3 PRCU	3 PRCU	Being co-located with the RCMP was extremely beneficial for planning and execution of day-to-day operations.	Whenever possible, units should ensure that they're co-located with the lead agency.	INTERNAL - Concor		
17	Resources - OOH	3 PRCU	3 PRCU	The additional and varied and various policy and security data, but was changed, or interpreted much differently by COC since the requests were made.	Recommended that drafts on incidents and MWS are sought well before an M/A is received, and the information becomes a part of the Admin Awppt in the BNJ order.	INTERNAL - Concor		
18	Resources - RTA & Garrison / Local Support	3 PRCU	3 PRCU	There was an unmet difference for lead up agreements between the military, the RCMP, and IC field PAs. The necessity for OOH units in areas are more responsible for siting, creating a large gap in the ability of the agencies, and the ability to respond to rapidly changing in order to support operations over a period of 72 hours.	Recommended that on DODM One all deployed forces will under the secondary priorities of the lead organization (RCMP / IC / PA) or commandants that require or being used for all potential remote areas is not feasible.	COC/JTFP - Concor		
19	JTFP IMC	Information Management	Information Management	The COS planning Directive came out on Saturday 8 AM 17 but the COC site was not opened up until the morning of Monday 10 July and then that afternoon for the RTT submit.	Have an Op LENTUS site ready to go and available to the RTTs. This would allow a common site for all documents to be put up from the start of the operation.	COC/JTFP - Concor		
20	JTFP G3	3 - Operations	3 - Operations	Once site creation started on 30 May it did not take long thanks to the templates made by COC that speed could be improved.	Have a collaborative site from the start and have one location for all official documents, DGS and presentations.	COC/JTFP - Concor		
21	JTFP J2	3 - Intelligence / Security / IO	3 - Intelligence / Security / IO	A viable LO from 31st was used to JTFP at the start of the operation. The LO enabled an insight into COC/JTFP/RCMP that would have been difficult to replicate through other cells or VTCs. The LO also ensured JTFP staff understood the nature and complexity of deploying a LT within the JTFP AOR. Lastly, the presence of the LO hastened and reinforced the reporting mechanisms between JTFP and JTFP.	The should be established for future operations where 3rd Can Div would a LT to support JTFP. Furthermore, relationships with JTFP staff, including COC, should be bolstered before operations begin.	COC/JTFP - Concor		
22	JTFP W	3 - Operations	3 - Operations	Orders and reports from COC and JTFP established to identify forces that had been out of COC/JTFP as the RTT/W.	COC should use the terminology LT instead of LCC.	COC/JTFP - Concor		
				Also, the issue has been raised previously that the correct terminology for the lead force assigned should be a Lead Task Force (LTF) rather than a Lead Component Command (LCC). An LCC is an operational level command. The use of LTF mirrors the use of the ATP.	Once forces are out of COC and COC/JTFP to an RTT, they are no longer identified by their original designator BRU, DMC, Ranger Patrol, etc. They become part of the LT and should be reported as such.	COC/JTFP - Concor		
				COC IMAGO 001 directed CA to IC LCC, DMC and CS where it should have been to task CA to IC on LTF.				

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Annex D to JTFW/LEITUS 17-06 POST OPERATION REPORT
 Lessons Learned
 6415-1350 (JTFP IL00)

Case No. (COTI/Initial)	Phase	Operation/Phase	Operation/Phase	Requirements/Issues/Findings	JTF	COC	GR
23	JTFW	3 - Operations	CFPTO Briefing Management	<p>From 01 to 13 July 2017 JTFW issued JTFP to develop the CFPTO Briefing, with assistance from contracting L1A, L1A/CSC and J9 COG created their briefings to manage their personnel. Their formation level descriptions were essential to JTFW. A list of personnel were issued before their deployment into the DA. JTFW wanted to manage these briefings during the operations, whereas 3 COG Div experiences has shown that they are best managed by the parent formation. This is especially true for the 3rd COG, who can closely monitor the availability of their personnel and the need to replace them.</p> <p>JTFW also wanted to differentiate those who were FT, and those who were employed on LEITUS but not with the LIT; in essence, the FG brigade and the FE Brigades. This was difficult to determine, as some people were supporting the operations but not part of the LIT (eg 3rd Div re-assembly from Edmonton to the LIT, primary support personnel, etc).</p>	INTERNAL - Concur		
24	3 COG Div 05	3 - Operations	Employment of MPB	<p>COG Op-0 and Op-1 specifically mentioned MPB in their reports as well as Force Protection and within the force. In the next day the deployed MPB have been included in the provision of ID to the local police forces, for Force Protection as well as execution of the mission.</p>	COG/JTFP - Concur		
25	3 COG Div 05	3 - Operations	Trained in Place	<p>SOUO00 has BPT tests to RCN and RCMP to Force Generation 1st and 2nd waves of reinforcements for DND (MARS). RCMP did not offer JTFW. MARS/CSC conducted a staff check of MARS/CSC available to train and did not train nor deploy follow on forces.</p> <p>Level 3 The fighter training can be done in 5 days to non-soldiers. Despite minimal CS RCN and RCMP parts could play a role. As a minimum RCMP/RCMP should be able to deploy some forces to support the LIT.</p>	COG/JTFP - Through staff checks were made for this direction from level 3 indicated the CA had sufficient capacity and the RCN/RCMP would not be tasked		
26	3 COG Div 06	4 - Logistics	Contracting	<p>JTFW and 3 COG Div came up with a mutually agreed upon path for contracting support to the LIT. There is also no mention of Emergency Contracting in the 3 Div Op Order.</p>	COG/JTFP - Concur with detailed request plan		
27	3 COG Div HQ 01	1 - Personnel/ Administration	Staffs - Personnel	<p>Authority and liability responsibility for personnel responsibilities were not clearly understood by all levels of responsibility for Communications and Medical responsibilities. FE units were conducting FG units/operations directly for results in a number of cases into seeking authority from FE formation and informing FG personnel.</p>	INTERNAL - Concur		
28	LIT P	3 - Personnel/ Administration	Medical	<p>Medical network and phone is a 6/2/1 issue. In the case of Op LEITUS, it was tasked to the 3rd COG. Additionally the medical preparation or all levels (patients, leadership, and family) have been far beyond the capability of most 15 minute phone call every time days (30-1.7, 30-1.7, 30-1.7, 30-1.7, 30-1.7, 30-1.7). Staff did provide a 4 country a very hospital in location.</p>	COG/JTFP - Concur		

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Annex D to JTF-LIBERTUS 17-08 POST OPERATION REPORT
 Lessons Learned
 6435-1336 (JTFP LSO)

Task List (DND/US/USC)	Phase	Organization	Characterized Issues	Recommendations / Solutions	JTFP	COC	DIR
29	JTFW 3 - Operations	Headquarters Operations	This point will disagree with an entry above from ACE31M regarding C2 arrangements for the Maritime portion of Op LIBERTUS 17-08. The 30000 and C3-CI Directive both clearly state that in certain circumstances an operations can be C2V directly from the CAC. It is noted that for an auxiliary ATP based on an ACE2, the CAC is not required to be the "primary" C2. The CAC and the ACE31M had both been included in the C2 chain from CAC-CAC-ASB. It would have added unnecessary delay and complexity. The system that all actions defaulted to worked well. It must be noted that the CAC-Frog O for this Op only added to the confusion as it gave the ATP-COM to JTFW but lacked the CAC to "Force Employ" the AT. The difference was never clarified by COC.	It is recommended that future operations of this sort use clearer C2 relationships communicated from the start by COC. Ideally, in this case PAC would retain OPCOM of the ATP with ACE31M coordinating/supporting as required.			
30	3 COM DIR GS 5 - Operations	Road Property and Environment	Environmental remediation information, and Road Property Lead Use Agreements were replaced during hand over of the Breckton and the Road Prop Officers during the Ex. The regular frequency of staff made tracking which sites were not cleaned and which sites were cleaned very difficult to complete. While this is true, there is a high priority for the ATP to be available. The services that were provided were mostly quite good and closed out the camp and the 130s with few issues.	WARNING - Maintain a single POC for Environmental Concerns and Road Property LIA. By not assigning staff on a regular basis, continuity will be obtained and facilitate easier tracking of Envs / Property concerns. A detailed tracker should be created at the beginning of the Operation and maintained with proper handover management to track loss of information.	INTERNAL - Concur		
31	1 Sec Bn 4 - Logistics	Responsibilities for CSS	Responsibilities for 2nd Line support requirements were not clearly identified between JTF-P and JTF-W for support to the 1st. Particularly when it comes to contracting and obtaining FG supplies of 1. Change.	We need a clear support dependency matrix that defines responsibilities between JTF-P and JTF-W for each element of supply and services for the lead task force.	INTERNAL - Concur		
32	LTP P 1 - Personnel Management	Morale and Welfare Support	The logistical and morale and welfare policy was incredibly clear, but was changed, or interpreted much differently by COC once the operations were made.	Personnel that deploy are headcounted and JTFWS are sought well before an M&A to ensure that the information becomes a part of the Admin Annex in the 180 order.	COC/JTFP - Concur		
33	LTP P 4 - Logistics	Lead Use Agreements	There was no marked difference for lead use agreements between the military, the RCMP, and the 1800 Fries. The necessity for DND LIA's in areas not responsible for set up, created a large administrative burden, slowed down operations, and caused confusion. An example of this was when a platoon of personnel was requested to rapidly deploy in order to support evacuation operations over a period of 72 hours.	Recommend that COC Op all facilities forces (AF) under the command of the lead element (RCMP / AC / Fries) or contractors make that including or being LIA's for all projects/vehicle assets is not feasible.	COC/JTFP - Concur with further safety investigation		



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Annex E
6435-3350-1 (JTFP ILSO/RDIMS 745226)
27 November 2017

Operation LENTUS 17-04

Summary


Joint Task Force Pacific






Discussion Points

- Joint Operations Area
- Timeline of Operation
- Operation Overview
 - Personnel
 - Tasks
 - Organizational Structures
 - Transition Criteria (Mission Success)
 - Statistics
- Significant Observations
- Discussion




Joint Operations Area

- Full Joint Operations Area designated as the Province of BC due to expanse of the fires.
- ATF fulfilled tasks throughout the Province.
- LTF Area of Operations depicted below.



Land Task Force Area of Operations






Requests for Assistance (RFAs) and Tasks

- RFA #1 - 9 Jul 17
 - Provision of air assets to support emergency evacuation of threatened communities
 - Provision of air support to move first responders and equipment
 - Air Movement Teams to support the processing of personnel during air evacuation
- RFA #2 – 17 Jul 17
 - Provision of Observation and Reporting Points to assist/enable evacuation
 - Assist with ground evacuation and movement of equipment
- RFA #3 – 3 Aug 17
 - Provision of self-sustained firefighting (Tier 3) personnel
 - Provision of CAF facilities for use as BCWS staging areas for personnel entering and departing the fire areas



Timeline



Preparation
 Deployment
 Employment
 Re-deployment

RFA #2


RFA #3

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Personnel Assigned to OP



Total Personnel Deployed - 2200 +



6/15




Joint Task Force Organizational Structure







Inter-Agency Liaison



6 x PEOCS
(Provincial Regional
Emergency Operations
Centres)



1 x PECC (Provincial
Emergency Coordination
Centre)



CAF Liaison deployed:

- PECC
- Active PREOCs
- BCWS Ops Centre
- RCMP DEOC




Air Task Force



9/15



Land Task Force



10/15



Advisors / Support Capabilities

- Public Affairs embedded at both LTF and ATF
- AJAG forward deployed with LTF
- Formation Safety & Environment forward deployed with LTF
- Military Police forward deployed with LTF
- Health Services forward deployed with LTF and ATF
- GBA+ representative
- Cultural Awareness Training
- FN / KLE conducted by the LTF

11/15



Op LENTUS 17-04 Transition Criteria

The following criteria were developed in collaboration with our Provincial partners and continue to be discussed with a view to accurately reflect the requirements.

	Criteria for Success and Mission Completion	Staff	15 Sep
1	Management of critical incidents (emergency) is within provincial capabilities.	J2	
2	Military capabilities are no longer required for	J3	
	A Emergency evacuation support	J3	
	B Air Lift / Ground Transport (Personnel / Material)	J3	
	C RCMP assistance to inform, observe and report	J3	
	D Self-sufficient firefighting operations (Note #1 below)	J3	
	E Transient/Accommodations in support of BCWS	J3	
3	Consequence management (recovery) is being actioned by provincial authorities and within provincial capabilities.	J3	

Note #1. Self-sufficient firefighting operations defined as: Organization providing integral communication, transportation, and service support capable of conducting firefighting within a Level III capability including fire-line patrol, mop-up and cold trailing



Majority of Conditions Met.



Conditions Progressing.



No Conditions Met.



Statistics

CAF RESPONSE TO THREE INDEPENDENT RFAs

- Aircraft on heightened readiness providing support to Provincial Partners
- Support to the RCMP
- Support to BCWS

OPERATION LENTUS
17-04 BC WILDFIRE

The Canadian Armed Forces responded to requests for assistance from the British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Yukon provinces, the British Columbia Volunteer Service and RCMP with a number of requests, including: provide on-call and physical support to firefighters; provide air support to BC Wildfire; provide on-call and physical support to provide support to local populations; and evacuation of critical facilities at Overton Air Force Base. Through the provided support, the Canadian Armed Forces provided support to the British Columbia Wildfire Service.

2,218 CAF Personnel

- 150 Units
- 3 Cdn Div
- 1487 AC
- 583F

8,360 Hectares

- Aerial application by CAF personnel

48 Observer/Report Posts

- 22,695 Vehicles
- 54,760 People

5 Aircraft Types

- CC-177 Globemaster
- CH-149 Griffon
- CH-146 Griffon
- CH-124 Sea King

288 Flights

- 150,000 tonnes of equipment and cargo
- 936 Personnel moved

150 Vehicles

- and 5,000 tonnes of equipment, etc.

13/15



Key Take Away (Observations)

Request for Assistance

- Limited resources and/or no strategic effort
- Increase risk of compromising bio shield the body
- Difficult to extract assets and equipment and/or to get personnel

Operational Level Admin/Int/Fin

- JTF may find it difficult to meet the requirement of sustained operations
- JTF may be budgeted early

Liaison

- Key element to successful RSO/JOA
- Requirement of program/program
- Work with all potential partners to enhance working relationships

Readiness / NTM, NFP, RP

- Messaging partners with interest to raise/assist/reliefs
- Assets can be assigned from outside provide (improved readiness)
- Allows greater flexibility to get personnel force generation processes

Force Structure

- JTF may be able to expand the operation
- Larger JTF and greater AOC would require the deployment of JCS
- AFB high demand demand reflective of multiple operations

RSOMI/JOA

- Force Generator completed RSO/JOA (JTF limited capability)
- Coordinate with designation of the JCS as the JCS operations conducting the JCS operations



Discussion

